Quoting Arnold A. Offner’s American Appeasement: United States Foreign Policy and Germany, 1933–1938, pages 57–60:

Diplomatic opinion differed on the new Germany. For the American consul general at Stuttgart, Leon Dominian, Germany’s new masters represented something old, “the cynical militarism of their predecessors of pre‐Weimar days,” and, he felt, the United States should deal with them accordingly.

For Douglas Miller, commercial attaché in Berlin, the average [German Fascist] was essentially a “young, ignorant, and romantic” misfit, willing to declare the modern capitalistic world in which he had never known success a failure, voting for a “return to medieval status where the individual does not have to do his own thinking.” [German Fascism’s so‐called] revolution, Miller believed, was the work of a handful of “fanatics and adventurers who had learned how to appeal to the moron majority in a period of depression and discouragement.”¹¹

Miller and many other Americans did not yet believe the [German Fascists] a large threat. The NSDAP represented “almost unanimous” German opinion on such critical questions as disarmament and revision of the Treaty of Versailles. Still, the [supposed] revolution was both an assertion of Germany’s rights against other nations and an effort at adjusting class and occupational problems in Germany.¹²

By the summer of 1933 Miller regarded Hitler and his immediate lieutenants as the moderate forces trying desperately to ward off a second revolution. Withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference hardly disturbed Miller, who remained unconvinced as to any threat of the new German government in international affairs.

Having given Mein Kampf a careful reading, he concluded that Hitler’s advocacy of deception in foreign affairs, his “inflammatory statements regarding foreign policy and Germany’s mission to expand in the East,” were all so much propaganda. There was no reason for concern: “The Nazis’ war talk, superman talk and posing is simply designed to impress their followers and should be discounted.”¹³

Davis, the American disarmament negotiator, had reached much the same conclusions. No one could understand what was happening in [the Third Reich] without being there. Germany, he wrote from Berlin in the early spring of 1933, was in the midst of a “real revolution.” One had to expect “certain excesses,” though the American press probably made too much of them.

He could not determine the course of the [supposed] revolution and its effects on foreign policy. These would depend on Hitler’s ability to withstand radicals in his party and also to shackle the semimilitary forces he had organized for purposes of the [so‐called] revolution. The Hitler government was committed to an early revision of the Treaty of Versailles, although the exact method was unclear.¹⁴

Long‐term objectives of the Hitler government did not appear of immediate concern. American diplomats knew that in 1933 Germany was no threat. Politically isolated, mired in the world‐wide economic collapse which saw more than 6,000,000 Germans unemployed, its army of 100,000 greatly outnumbered and outgunned by the French, the [Third Reich] could not move in any direction without running against the French alliance system.¹⁵

Nonetheless, [the Third Reich] affected American interests, and it was necessary for the government to respond to developments there.

One development, persecution of the Jews, had by no means assumed a pattern in 1933. From the end of January until the March 5 Reichstag elections, the government and NSDAP proceeded cautiously with anti‐Semitic policies, attacking Jews who were opponents of the [NSDAP] by virtue of their being Social Democrats or Communists.

After March 5, commanding a majority in the Reichstag for the first time through support by the Nationalists, the [Fascists] made their attacks more frequent, arbitrary, and bloody. The government apologized, blaming undisciplined NSDAP members acting as party men, not government officials. As attacks abated everyone waited to see what would be the outcome of the government’s official one‐day boycott of all Jewish businesses scheduled for April 1.¹⁶

Ambassador Sackett reported in early March that four American Jews in Berlin had been beaten up and one of them forced to rescind an eviction notice against a [Fascist] tenant who owed a year’s rent. Hull lodged no protest, and when Hitler on the morning of March 11 issued a public appeal to his followers to maintain law and order, Sackett optimistically declared anti‐Jewish demonstrations at an end.¹⁷

Violence intensified. Shortly a delegation representing American Jewish organizations called upon Hull to urge him to protest to the German government. He declined, saying at a press conference next day that the United States was still “endeavoring industriously” to gain information on conditions in [the Third Reich].¹⁸

(Emphasis added. Much of the chapter goes on like this, and I had to stop here so as to avoid testing your patience.)