The issue was more Cambodia, Vietnam, Afghanistan and where ever else they undermined local socialist forces. But the USSR did create its own hangmen, when they reintroduced liberalism and did de-kolkhoziation
Chinese foreign policy back then is something a lot of people have trouble with. For what it’s worth, I think there’s a realpolitik answer to why China did it - they knew the USA would intervene on the side of the compradors in any and all conflicts in China’s region if the conflict was socialists vs compradors, and that meant the USA could establish a foreard deployment of activated military. If China intervened on behalf of the revolutionaries, the USA would redouble it’s involvement and China couldn’t defeat the USA. So the solution was to take the board position that the USA would normally inhabit, preventing the USA from entering the theater. By intervening on behalf of the compradors, the USA had no pretext for intervention and China ended up with a forward deployed activated military presence AND significant influence over the governments.
This interpretation is congruent with their approach to capitalism as well, taking up the position that the USA would normally inhabit in exploiting workers by freely allowing Western capitalists to get rich off of exploited Chinese citizens. This resulted in China occupying the space the USA would normally be in and also giving China significant control over the means of production while also making it impossible to spin a narrative that China needs to be destroyed for its behavior.
So the solution was to take the board position that the USA would normally inhabit, preventing the USA from entering the theater. By intervening on behalf of the compradors, the USA had no pretext for intervention and China ended up with a forward deployed activated military presence AND significant influence over the governments
This makes no sense, especially considering that the US did intervene in at least two of the mentioned cases.
It makes sense. It just doesn’t mean it worked or worked in all cases or even that it would work long term. China abandoned this era of its foreign policy likely because it wasn’t theoretically sound, but if you’re going to say it makes no sense then you’re going to have to provide some supporting argument.
What is the idea behind intervening in a region on the side that is anti-communist with the goal of making NATO stop intervening on the anti-communist side? Does one hope that NATO gets confused by a polity that has been trying to normalise relations with them joining on their side?
The idea is that NATO or the USA no longer has the pretext to enter the battle against communism because they would have to fight China and the revolutionaries against the minority incumbent. Because NATO cannot enter the battlefield, China gets to deploy its military and supply chains into the theater while the West does not. This expands China’s force projection without triggering a reciprocal expansion of Western force projection .
The idea is that NATO or the USA no longer has the pretext to enter the battle against communism because they would have to fight China and the revolutionaries against the minority incumbent
Except that they still do have that pretext, as they are still opposing local communist movements and the USSR.
Also, even if that was true - that it wouldn’t actually be fighting to suppress communist movements - logical consistency and factual-ness of justifications of such actions is not important for performing such actions. Hell, they could just not make these justifications and keep the relevant operations unadvertised.
Because NATO cannot enter the battlefield
But they obviously can, and did (via the Mujahideen in the case of Afghanistan).
What even is the argument for the presence of the PRC somehow making NATO removing its presence from a region?
You missed the tactical problem I raised, which is that if the USA entered the battlefield it would be either as an ally of China or it would need to fight both China and the revolutionary movement.
Regarding the development of the Mujahideen, that is demonstrably NOT entering the battlefield and needing to find another way to influence the game. The development and use of the Mujahideen is quite fundamentally different than USA’s intervention in Korea and Vietnam. For China, losing a local revolutionary movement is a small loss compared with having a permanent USA military base on the Korean peninsula.
In essence, China moving in militarily creates a forward deployment that is still a material threat to the USA. If China did so on the side of the revolutionariew against the establishment, they would fighting the establishment military, which the USA could augment. Instead, China gets the full benefit of the establishment military and if the USA did intervene it would tactically be fighting in two fronts simultaneously. This creates forward deployments of Chinese assets with logistical support and an extension of Chinese military recon, all of which benefit China against Western intervention without creating political openings on the world stage and most importantly at the UN.
You missed the tactical problem I raised, which is that if the USA entered the battlefield it would be either as an ally of China or it would need to fight both China and the revolutionary movement
What’s the tactical issue here, though? That NATO would have to act not according to the image it tries to project, i.e. that NATO would do as NATO always does?
I’m not buying that anybody would seriously base their policy of military and clandestine activities abroad on betting that NATO would care about theatrics when NATO states were formally and very publicly allied with the USSR during the late WW2.
In essence, China moving in militarily creates a forward deployment that is still a material threat to the USA. If China did so on the side of the revolutionariew against the establishment, they would fighting the establishment military, which the USA could augment
In Afghanistan, the PRC aided the Mujahideen revolutionaries against the establishment, which only helped NATO.
I’m sorry, but this reads like your conjecture, and not something that you can provide a source on (I welcome you to prove me wrong on this matter), and I don’t see how anybody can defend this sort of foreign policy on the grounds of it somehow helping communist movements in the world.
The issue was more Cambodia, Vietnam, Afghanistan and where ever else they undermined local socialist forces. But the USSR did create its own hangmen, when they reintroduced liberalism and did de-kolkhoziation
Chinese foreign policy back then is something a lot of people have trouble with. For what it’s worth, I think there’s a realpolitik answer to why China did it - they knew the USA would intervene on the side of the compradors in any and all conflicts in China’s region if the conflict was socialists vs compradors, and that meant the USA could establish a foreard deployment of activated military. If China intervened on behalf of the revolutionaries, the USA would redouble it’s involvement and China couldn’t defeat the USA. So the solution was to take the board position that the USA would normally inhabit, preventing the USA from entering the theater. By intervening on behalf of the compradors, the USA had no pretext for intervention and China ended up with a forward deployed activated military presence AND significant influence over the governments.
This interpretation is congruent with their approach to capitalism as well, taking up the position that the USA would normally inhabit in exploiting workers by freely allowing Western capitalists to get rich off of exploited Chinese citizens. This resulted in China occupying the space the USA would normally be in and also giving China significant control over the means of production while also making it impossible to spin a narrative that China needs to be destroyed for its behavior.
This makes no sense, especially considering that the US did intervene in at least two of the mentioned cases.
It makes sense. It just doesn’t mean it worked or worked in all cases or even that it would work long term. China abandoned this era of its foreign policy likely because it wasn’t theoretically sound, but if you’re going to say it makes no sense then you’re going to have to provide some supporting argument.
What is the idea behind intervening in a region on the side that is anti-communist with the goal of making NATO stop intervening on the anti-communist side? Does one hope that NATO gets confused by a polity that has been trying to normalise relations with them joining on their side?
The idea is that NATO or the USA no longer has the pretext to enter the battle against communism because they would have to fight China and the revolutionaries against the minority incumbent. Because NATO cannot enter the battlefield, China gets to deploy its military and supply chains into the theater while the West does not. This expands China’s force projection without triggering a reciprocal expansion of Western force projection .
Except that they still do have that pretext, as they are still opposing local communist movements and the USSR.
Also, even if that was true - that it wouldn’t actually be fighting to suppress communist movements - logical consistency and factual-ness of justifications of such actions is not important for performing such actions. Hell, they could just not make these justifications and keep the relevant operations unadvertised.
But they obviously can, and did (via the Mujahideen in the case of Afghanistan).
What even is the argument for the presence of the PRC somehow making NATO removing its presence from a region?
You missed the tactical problem I raised, which is that if the USA entered the battlefield it would be either as an ally of China or it would need to fight both China and the revolutionary movement.
Regarding the development of the Mujahideen, that is demonstrably NOT entering the battlefield and needing to find another way to influence the game. The development and use of the Mujahideen is quite fundamentally different than USA’s intervention in Korea and Vietnam. For China, losing a local revolutionary movement is a small loss compared with having a permanent USA military base on the Korean peninsula.
In essence, China moving in militarily creates a forward deployment that is still a material threat to the USA. If China did so on the side of the revolutionariew against the establishment, they would fighting the establishment military, which the USA could augment. Instead, China gets the full benefit of the establishment military and if the USA did intervene it would tactically be fighting in two fronts simultaneously. This creates forward deployments of Chinese assets with logistical support and an extension of Chinese military recon, all of which benefit China against Western intervention without creating political openings on the world stage and most importantly at the UN.
What’s the tactical issue here, though? That NATO would have to act not according to the image it tries to project, i.e. that NATO would do as NATO always does?
I’m not buying that anybody would seriously base their policy of military and clandestine activities abroad on betting that NATO would care about theatrics when NATO states were formally and very publicly allied with the USSR during the late WW2.
In Afghanistan, the PRC aided the Mujahideen revolutionaries against the establishment, which only helped NATO.
I’m sorry, but this reads like your conjecture, and not something that you can provide a source on (I welcome you to prove me wrong on this matter), and I don’t see how anybody can defend this sort of foreign policy on the grounds of it somehow helping communist movements in the world.